By R Khan

Whereas, in the rest of NWFP where Pakhtoon nationalist, reformist movement with its anti-violence philosophical traditions and Deoband Madrasa-linked JUI -- also with its anti-violent traditions -- were politically strong, but could not resist extremism to thrive under the military junta
Zia thought that the best way to eliminate any threat such as the Pakhtoonistan Movement that always haunted Pakistani establishment through stepped up support to clerical elements within Afghanistan. As the perpetrators of the Pakhtoonistan Movement in Afghanistan were secular, liberal elements, Zia thought the clerics of Afghanistan could be supported to overtake the weak Afghan state. Through pumping billions of rupees from Pakistan's own exchequer along with US financial assistance, extremist clerics were made so strong to weaken the already enfeebled Afghan state where the tribes always had a voluntary allegiance with the rulers of Kabul.
Zia had a plan to use them to engage India in Kashmir through a guerrilla warfare which was implemented after his death that culminated in Kargil War. After the change in the state policy of reversal of traditional Kashmir policy these elements imbued with pseudo-Jihadi sentiments felt betrayed along with all those in the establishment who nurtured them.
Presently, the jihadis finding no space for expression of their inculcated dogmas and physical actions have now found it expedient to declare a war on Pakistan state. The ability of the extremist groups was enhanced by the deteriorating social and economic conditions, easy access to weapons on account of the Afghan war, support by the government and intelligence agencies to different groups for their own political goals, including the use of media to promote their causes.
In order to check extremism Pakistan has to formulate consistent policies. Inconsistent policy of the state has wreaked havoc. First, the policy was to make terrorists and then try to dismantle them.
”An important aspect of extremism is that Pakistan has to review its Afghan policy as the policy of strategic depth is not relevant. We also have to realize our Afghan brethren that Pakistan is not against them. Recently, I visited Afghanistan and I got the feeling there that the Afghan intelligentsia think Pakistan is out there to turn their country into its fifth province. In fact, we in Pakistan should not be worried who is in power there.”
“Unless the strategic depth policy is reversed and the Afghan phobia of our establishment ends I don't think that the state support to extremists could be scotched. “
"Pakistani agencies should be brought under the control of parliament and they should be made accountable for their activities to the people of Pakistan. The problem is that our agencies have become adept in waging proxy wars and they did so in Kashmir, Bengal, Kargil, Kabul and FATA. Now these agencies without any responsibility towards the people do what they deem correct. There is urgent need to bring our foreign and domestic policies in people's hand our policies would remain myopic."
“An important aspect of marginalising extremists in Pakistan particularly their hideouts and influence in FATA is to allow political parties to carry out their activities there and organize tribesmen politically. He said, "To curb extremism economic development in marginalised areas especially the Frontier is very important. However, it should be ensured that the development process should be in harmony with the culture of these areas. “
"In Frontier especially, the FATA traditional leadership structures and power centres have been dismantled and replaced by clerical extremists. These structures need to be brought back, reinforced and modernize,"
In Frontier, the nationalist parties have also had to play a more proactive role. They do not have to restrict to mere slogans for provincial rights because due to their inactivity and failure in delivering despite having a popular mandate in Pakhtoon areas disenchanted people and made them fall into the lap of clerical and militant groups.
The so-called religious parties having their government in NWFP and Balochistan since 2002 have to be asked by the state to clarify their position over militancy and extremism. They have either to operate in democratic, electoral politics and have to stop their support to extremists and terrorists and also to use their own youths in militant activities
The Jamaat-e-Islami has to renounce links and declare that it does not, as a policy, believe in militancy. Otherwise, its record in taking part in militancy against Bengalis in Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Kashmir suggests otherwise. The establishment also has to stop supporting the JI for its vested interests as it did in the past.
"Religious parties should give a clear 'fatwa' if suicide attacks are 'haram' or not. In Pakhtoon areas, all the political forces -- at least the nationalist democratic parties -- should put their heads together and join hands to find a solution even if the clerical parties are not ready to do so."
The News On Sunday
Political Economy