http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/ Political discussion in general en Fri, 10 Sep 2010 03:23:22 GMT vBulletin 60 http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/images/tweaked/misc/rss.png http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/ http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8713-%C2%91Military-s-predation-is-an-institutional-feature%C2%92&goto=newpost Sun, 05 Sep 2010 15:11:35 GMT Today, we face a state of military hegemony: political, economic and intellectual control. There is not a single young scholar who is not on the... Today, we face a state of military hegemony: political, economic and intellectual control. There is not a single young scholar who is not on the military's payroll or network. Shahbaz Sharif used to instruct the police to facilitate Hamid Gul's Varan bus service

Source Here

A dissident’s job is always fraught with dangers. In case of Pakistan, the risks involved in criticizing all-powerful Khakis and their proxy Taliban hardly need an elucidation. Still, dissident voices keep tormenting military establishment. Ayesha Siddiqa is one such ‘tormenter’. In an interview with Viewpoint, she candidly exposes the Khaki myths painstakingly built by indoctrinating outlets. Read on:

Tell us about yourself.

I was born and raised in Lahore which probably explains my madness. I grew up in a Lahore which was really a cultural and intellectual hub. Being the only child of a writer-mother - Jamila Hashmi - I was dragged around by her to all sorts of places like the Pak Tea House, Writer's Guild and others. Grew up seeing some of the top intellectual icons of our country. I went to Cathedral High School which was then the only co-ed educational institution. Later, I did my graduation from Kinnaird College, Lahore and Masters in Political Science from the Punjab University as an external student because I had by then joined the civil services. In 1992, I went to the UK to do my Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College, London. One of the first books my mother gave me to read was Maxim Gorky's autobiography. Right across my school was People's Publishing House that sold translations of some of the most fantastic literary works from the then Soviet Union. I still return to Gorky when I am lost. I read almost all Russian authors, English literature and some French authors. I was raised to become a fiction writer but I probably didn't have the balls for that. I still desire to be one because great fiction makes great people.





If one goes by WikiLeaks and reports frequently appearing in global media, the ISI is patronizing Taliban. In your book, Military Inc. and numerous other articles you have written, military appears as a conglomerate with financial and industrial interests. Don't you think GHQ's Afghan and Kashmir policy is in contradiction with its economic interests?

In fact, these policies constitute the foundations on which the empire stands. It is the narrative through which everything else is sold. Contrary to the propaganda that military is the only surviving institution of the state, it is also a victim of the politics of its echelons. There are factions within the military: some support the west and other the Islamists. There is not one policy but several policies. But at a glance, the sense of being a nuclear weapon state gives the army a certain confidence to engage in misadventures. But more than everything else, dependence on non-state actors is built into its own tactical narrative. This means that it will not give up its claim on either Kashmir or Afghanistan. These two issues are essential in the process of militarizing the society and the societal mindset, which, in turn, is necessary for military's predation. Today, we face a state of military hegemony: political, economic and intellectual control. Today, there is not a single university in Pakistan or a young scholar who is not on the military's payroll or network. They open shops called think-tanks for their young clients. A journalist, who does not take directions from the military, is a rarity in today's Pakistan. Institutionally, this outreach is done through the ISPR and the ISI. But there are other informal channels as well such as the army chief himself. Recently, heard a top Pakistani journalist claim in a private meeting that the military intends to fight the Taliban because he had heard that from the army chief with whom he had about six private sessions. The national security narrative built on and around the Kashmir and Afghanistan issues is critical for establishing military's hegemony.

Every time ISI is accused of patronizing Taliban, we are told bout over 2000 soldiers who have sacrificed their lives in 'war on terror'. What explains this contradiction. Who is army patronizing, if it is patronizing, and who it is fighting back?
The army only fights those militants who have gone astray but the policy is to continue supporting non-state actors. Over the past couple of decades or more, the army has developed an operational dependence on these forces. The animosity with India is ideological and so there will always be the need to build and sustain elements having blind faith in destroying the enemy and not question the narrative. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and certain factions of the Taliban are considered friendly and dependable. However, there is no real plan to ensure that they all stay strictly in control. For instance, there are elements from within the friendly forces that go astray and launch an attack. Army's own men dying helps build the narrative that it is under attack and so deserves sympathy and support of the people.

The Viewpoint was told by an ISPR spokesperson: ''As for as the defense budget is concerned it's total Rs. 450 billion which makes almost 17 percent of the total budget whereas propaganda is more than 50 percent goes to military'' . Is it really 17 percent or is it some twist here?

Under Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz the government introduced cosmetic changes such as de-linking military pensions from the main defense budget. There are about Rs. 100-150 billion that are not included in the budget. This is one problem. But then there is the overall share claimed by the military in national resources that would put the percentage at a much higher level. There is a need to monetize the military's commercial ventures and the state assets that they utilize for financial purposes to arrive at a correct figure. The defense budget calculated to the older formula (pensions and all other hidden items included) make it over 25% of CGE. The hidden items also include expenditure used on military but drawn from civilian head of expenditure. A calculation of defense expenditure based on their overall share of national resources would take the figure even higher.

A big justification for big defence budget is '' due to India's hegemonic designs''. When Pakistan went nuclear, we were told by government as well as military hawks that no body could cast an evil eye on Pakistan anymore. Why this big defense budget when we have The Bomb? And don't you think the ever increasing budget contradicts the logic behind The Bomb?

Since we follow the US-USSR example, there is no evidence that non-conventional defense reduces the need or the size for conventional defense. The nuclear deterrence causing budgetary reduction formula does not work for us at all because we have not gone into a phase of sustainable confidence-building measures or given up the military option for resolving disputes with India. The example being Kargil crisis or the attacks by non-state actors originating from Pakistan. Due to India's superior or quantitatively stronger position to push Pakistan up the conflict escalation spiral, buying major weapon systems to stave off threat of a war imposed by India in a nuclear environment becomes necessary. Our defense budget will never go down unless we change the politics of our rivalry with India.

Army claims to have a superb system of internal accountability. It is said many officers go home on minor corruption charges. That's why, they say, this organization is still intact and takes over the country with out bloody revolution. Your comments.

The organization does not survive because of its superior accountability but due to its mafia-style accountability. This means that while those at the top and at responsible positions are not touched, others who are not so well-connected are kept in line with this narrative of accountability. Firstly, the accountability system is flawed. It is one organization whose manpower (Department of the Auditor-General of Pakistan) conducts both internal and external audit. To give one example, I have served both as a military accountant and a defense auditor. Am I likely to point out issues with spending that I had approved during my tenure as part of the Military Accountant-General's organization? Second, the defense budget has over 20% wastage which is due to procurement of weapons and other items, incorrect human resource planning and a negative teeth-to-tail ratio. This means the military spends more on non-essentials than essentials. ]]> General Politics zar qurban http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8713-%C2%91Military-s-predation-is-an-institutional-feature%C2%92 http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8698-VIEW-Altaf-Hussain%C2%92s-martial-law-balloon-%C2%97Imtiaz-Alam&goto=newpost Sun, 29 Aug 2010 10:22:54 GMT Daily Times (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C08%5C29%5Cstory_29-8-2010_pg3_4) VIEW: Altaf Hussain’s martial law balloon... Daily Times

VIEW: Altaf Hussain’s martial law balloon —Imtiaz Alam

Building upon his ethnic appeal among the Urdu-speakers of Sindh, Altaf Hussain created a subservient power structure, backed by his armed loyalists, who are under orders to kill those who dare to defy the leader

The martial law balloon floated by Mr Altaf Hussain, the MQM chief, has burst before it could even take off, thanks to an overwhelming reaction against it across all political divides, except for a media group and a bunch of beneficiaries-in-waiting. Among all democrats, Mian Nawaz Sharif and his PML-N deserve laurels for standing firm in defence of democracy and against any kind of military intervention. Quite curiously, the call for a military intervention was not addressed to the army chief, who is a professional Potohari soldier and not worthy of being “patriotic” in Mr Hussain’s eyes. The statement is tantamount to treason for fomenting a split in the army leadership and subverting the constitution. What is behind Altaf Hussain’s martial law balloon?

Mr Altaf Hussain’s provocative call to “patriotic generals” to clean up corruption and in fact pack up the democratically elected incumbents his party is in conflictual partnership with, and Mr Nawaz Sharif’s tougher rejoinder to his mimicry in defence of democracy, however flawed it may be, brings into sharp contrast the opposite pulls of our power structure and polity. This country has seen such insidious calls for martial law, and always on the pretext of getting rid of “corrupt and inefficient” politicians, with and without the blessings of the khakis in the past — some actually materialising in one after another takeover by the military rulers that always ended in greater disasters than whatever good they had promised as our ‘messiah’.

The urge for a messiah is as old as the helplessness rooted in the hopeless serf-feudal relationship that Mr Hussain is so fond of ‘fighting’ against while, ironically, reproducing it politically the way he lords over his political bandwagon as a feudal estate. Interestingly, Mr Hussian is himself a prototype messiah, whose political birth was midwifed by Amir-ul-Momineen General Ziaul Haq to create a countervailing urban force from among the Urdu-speaking settlers against the ‘feudal’ Bhutto’s PPP, which has to its credit that it fought against all military rulers for the restoration of democracy. Despite being a secular party and standing against religious terrorism, the MQM’s rabblerousing to “hang all the corrupt by any means” plays into the hands of the Islamic extremists who vow a bloody cleansing in a Taliban/Khomeini-style move. Even quite knowledgeable people are carried away by the fascist notion of taking a reprehensible course of mass-killing, much like the lumpen proletariat had performed on the streets of Paris during the French Revolution or the Taliban have done in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The MQM was created on the aggressive chauvinist appeal to Urdu-speakers to maintain the privileges of the salariat and frustrate the aspirations of the growing middle strata from among the deprived nationalities—Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baloch — while overcoming its rootlessness. Quite opportunistically, it became an appendage to successive military regimes to consolidate its ethnic power base in urban Sindh against the ‘feudal’ (read rural) Sindhis. It manipulated one party/ethnic group against the other to grab a greater share at the cost of the Sindhis and joined those feudal cliques who have had always sold the interests of the Sindhis. Building upon his ethnic appeal among the Urdu-speakers of Sindh, Altaf Hussain created a subservient power structure, backed by his armed loyalists, who are under orders to kill those who dare to defy the leader (Quaid ka jo ghadar hai, maut ka haqdar hai).

The MQM has remained in power by hook or crook for most of the time of its existence, especially during the martial laws of General Zia and General Musharraf (both quite ‘patriotic’?). The gravest worry for the MQM is that its so-called numerical ethnic majority in Karachi is under serious threat with radical demographic changes in the ethnic composition of urban Sindh. Most of the rural-to-urban migration is taking place towards Karachi. The outflow of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Pakhtunkhwa is mainly directed towards Karachi, resulting in ethnic tension between the Urdu-speakers and the Pakhtuns. Previous and recent target killings are in fact a battle for turf between the Mohajir and Pashtun mafias in Karachi, on the one hand, and to frustrate Pakhtun migration towards Karachi, on the other.

The havoc that the floods continue to cause, especially in Sindh now, has forced hundreds of thousands of Sindhi people from upper Sindh, including the poor and bonded labourers the MQM wants to emancipate from the yoke of the feudal landlords, to migrate towards Karachi for shelter. After Mohajirs have turned into a minority in Karachi, the MQM has become intolerant of any migration from anywhere, except fellow Biharis from Bangladesh. It has taken a “principled” stand against the migration of native Sindhis towards Karachi after having been uprooted from their native places, and has demanded the registration of the “homeless in their home”. Karachi has been part of Sindh since 1795, and our Mohajir friends are asking the natives for their permit. This has brought the Sindhi, Pakhtun and Mohajir coalition partners into an ominous conflict.

The call to the “patriotic generals” is to pressurise the PPP to stop the influx of Sindhis into Karachi, which will further reduce the numerical strength of Urdu-speakers. (It needs to be clarified that not all Mohajirs are in the MQM, not all Sindhis are in the PPP and not all Pakthuns are in the ANP). The fissures among the three coalition partners may lead to either the PPP bowing before the MQM’s demand to keep a new wave of Sindhis out of Karachi and lose its Sindhi constituency or the MQM going to any length to keep Karachi as its exclusive forte. But as the rural-to-urban migration grows and over a million Sindhis uprooted by the floods may prefer to settle in Karachi as their birthright, the Urdu-speakers may have to either contend with being a minority or make hell for whoever overtakes them. And obviously, the MQM will go to any extent to keep Karachi as its fief.

The bottom-line is that the MQM wants to retain its most privileged position that it had consolidated with the patronage of General Musharraf for nine long years. During the reign of Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim, the MQM was the most dominant player in Sindh at the cost of the Sindhis and the PPP. It suited the MQM to have pseudo-Sindhi partners than a majority-PPP. Over half a dozen times, the MQM has threatened to quit the PPP-led coalition on one demand or the other and the PPP had to beat a retreat to keep its reconciliation policy going. When Hyderabad was reverted to its erstwhile status by the PPP, the MQM forced it to revive three districts that were created by General Musharraf to give a majority to the MQM in Hyderabad. Similarly, it kept the posts of governor, chief secretary and DCOs in Karachi in its kitty and did not let the PPP-led government have any say in the affairs of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation.

But, perhaps, the room to make adjustments is getting too cramped. The PPP cannot abandon the poor Sindhis from seeking refuge in Karachi, nor should have the MQM — as a matter of principle — opposed it. But politics is all about constituencies and the MQM is no exception. On this issue, the MQM’s salvo has backfired and did not get any takers among both the internal and external establishments the MQM is quite embedded with. It would not like to bet its assets at the wrong time and on a wrong issue. The PPP, in the meanwhile, should cover its flanks and extend an olive branch towards Mr Sharif, who is talking sense and behaving well.

Imtiaz Alam is Editor of South Asian Journal. He can be reached at imtiazalampak@yahoo.com ]]> General Politics zar qurban http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8698-VIEW-Altaf-Hussain%C2%92s-martial-law-balloon-%C2%97Imtiaz-Alam http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8683-%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%90%D8%B3-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%98%D9%87-%D8%AF-%D9%BE%DA%9A%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88-%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88-%D9%BC%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88-1688&goto=newpost Sat, 21 Aug 2010 15:44:34 GMT د افغان او پنجاب په جګړې کښې د پنجاب پوځ او ای اېس ای د تالیبي ترهګرو په مرسته له تېرو نهو کالې راهیسې دې ټاکټیک ته هم ملاتړلې ده چي د پښتنو هر هغه مخوَر و وژني چي د اولس په لارښوونه او یوالي او د هیواد په بیا ابادۍ او ازادۍ کښې رغنده رول لوبولای شي

بشپړ لپاره دلته کليک کړئ ]]> General Politics zar qurban http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?8683-%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%90%D8%B3-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%98%D9%87-%D8%AF-%D9%BE%DA%9A%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88-%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88-%D9%BC%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88-1688